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JURISDICTION IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to§ 78-2a-3, Utah 
Code Ann. (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
-ISSVENCM 
In light of the defendant's lack of notice of the trial setting, was it proper for the trial 
court to deny defendant's motion to be relieved from the July 7,1997 judgment? This issue was 
raised in plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Decree filed September 18,1997. 
Standard of Review 
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is ordinarily reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 
(Utah 1996); Russell v. MartelL 681 P.2d 1193, 1994 (Utah 1984); Baker v. Western Sur. Co.. 
757 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah App. 1988). 
ISSUE NO. 2 
In light of the procedural errors of defendant's former counsel, plaintiffs counsel, and the 
trial court, was it proper for the trial court to deny defendant's motion to be relieved from the 
July 7,1997 judgment? This issue was raised in plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Decree, filed 
September 18,1997, and Motion to Reconsider, filed December 29, 1997. 
Standard of Review 
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed only 
for an abuse of discretion. Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1996); Russell v. MartelL 681 
Loporto v. Hoegemann 
Amended Brief of Appellant 
Page 1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P.2d 1193,1994 (Utah 1984); Baker v. Western Sur. Co.. 757 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah App. 1988). 
Whether the proper procedures were followed is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. Hartford Leasing Corp. v. Utah. 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 19941 Since this claim 
presents a question of law, it is reviewed under a correction of error standard, giving no , 
particular deference to the trial court's determination. See Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 471 
(Utah App. 1993); Holm v. Smilowitz. 840 P.2d 157, 160 (Utah App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 78-51-36. Utah Code Ann, (1996) 
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or ceases to act as such, a party to an , 
action or proceeding for whom he was acting as attorney must, before any farther proceedings 
are had against him be required by the adverse party, by written notice, to appoint another 
attorney or to appear in person. 
Rule 60. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record
 ( 
and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time 
of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court 
orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
\ 
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party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation 
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
Rule 4-506, Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
(1) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney may withdraw as 
counsel of record except when (a) a motion has been filed and is pending before the court or (b) a 
certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. Under these circumstances, an attorney may not 
withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. When an attorney withdraws under 
circumstances court approval is not required, the notice of withdrawal shall include a statement 
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by the attorney that there are no motions pending and that no certificate or readiness of trial has 
been filed. 
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, the withdrawing attorney must 
serve written notice of the withdrawal upon the client of the withdrawing attorney and upon all 
other parties not in default and a certificate of service must be filed with the court. If a trial date 
has been set, the notice of withdrawal shall include a notification of the trial date. 
(4) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from the case or 
ceases to act as an attorney, opposing counsel must notify the unrepresented client of his/her 
responsibility to retain another attorney or to appear in person before opposing counsel can 
initiate further proceedings against the client. A copy of the written notice shall be filed with the 
court and no further proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days have elapsed from the 
date of filing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A complaint for divorce was filed in this matter was filed on or about July 18,1995. The 
parties have two young children (R. 2-3). During the marriage, plaintiff worked as a pharmicist 
and defendant was a homemaker. 
After extensive litigation, a notice of bench trial scheduled for Monday, June 23, 1997 
was served upon the parties' counsel on May 21,1997 (R. 172). Defendant received no notice of 
any hearing until the Friday before trial at approximately 4:50 p.m. (R. 228). At that time, her 
counsel called and notified her that there was a hearing scheduled on the following Monday (R. 
228-9). She was told that it was just a hearing and that she could appear by telephone (R. 229). 
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On the morning of trial, the defendant's counsel sought leave from the court to withdraw 
(R. 184). Leave was granted, the court struck the defendant's answer, her default was entered, 
and plaintiff was awarded his attorneys fees and costs (R. 184, 398). Counsel for the plaintiff 
then requested further relief not in requested in his complaint, which the court granted (R. 184, 
398). No notice to appear or appoint counsel was filed. The notice of withdrawal of defendant's 
counsel was filed until June 25,1997 (R. 185). 
A final order was entered on July 7,1997 (R. 208). This order included further relief not 
requested in plaintiffs complaint or at trial (R. 229-30). 
Plaintiff filed her Rule 60(b) motion and supporting affidavit on September 18,1997. 
Defendant filed his responsive objection to the motion on October 6,1997. It was unsupported 
by affidavit or other documentation. No hearing was requested by either party. Defendant filed 
his reply memorandum on October 14,1997 and submitted the matter for decision on October 
23, 1998. The trial court denied by the motion by an order entered December 19, 1997 (R. 355). 
Defendant filed a motion to reconsider on December 29,1997 (R. 358). An order denying the 
motion to reconsider was entered January 21,1998 (R. 377). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Due to the actions or inaction of her former counsel, defendant was denied effective 
notice of the trial in this matter. Her failure to appear at trial constitutes a mistake, surprise or 
excusable neglect pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), Utah R. Civ. P. 
At trial, the defendant's former counsel sought and received the court's leave to withdraw 
as counsel. Rule 4-506 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides that plaintiffs 
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counsel was then required to file a notice to appear or appoint counsel and that no further 
proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days have elapsed from the filing of the notice. 
Contrary to Rule 4-506, the court in this matter immediately struck the pleadings of the defendant 
and granted additional relief to the plaintiff. 
:^ ARGUMENT 
L SURPRISE. MISTAKE OR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 
A. Defendant Had No Effective Notice of the Trial 
Trial in this case was scheduled for June 23,1997. Defendant was not made aware that 
there was a hearing scheduled in her case by her prior counsel until the Friday before trial at 4:50 
p.m. (R. 228) He did not make her aware that it was the final trial in the matter and did not 
informed her that she would not have to appear (R. 229). Mr. Dent consequently sought the 
leave of the court to withdraw as counsel and filed a notice of withdrawal. The defendant's 
answer was then stricken, her default entered, and the plaintiff was granted additional relief (R. 
229-30,398). A default judgment was entered July 7, 1997. 
On motion and upon such terms are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party from a final judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. 
Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civile Procedure. Where any reasonable excuse is offered by the 
defaulting party, courts generally favor grating relief from a default judgment, unless it appears 
that to do so would result in substantial injustice to the adverse party. Westinghouse Elec. 
Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor. 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). The court in Mavhew v. 
Standard Gilsonite Company. 376 P.2d 951 (Utah 1962) held that: 
Loporto v. Hoegemann 
Amended Brief of Appellant 
Page 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is undoubtedly correct that the trial court is endowed w itli considerable latitude of 
discretion in granting or denying such mot ions . However , it is also true that the court 
cannot act arbitrari ly in that regard, but should be generally indulgent toward permitt ing 
• M l inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they can be settled advisedly and in conformity 
• with law and jus t ice . To c lamp a j udgmen t rigidly and irrevocably on a party without a 
hearing is obvious ly a harsh and oppressive thing. It is fundamental in our sys tem of 
justice that each party to a controversy should be afforded an opportunity to present his 
side of the case. For that reason it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse o f discretion to 
refuse to vaca te a default judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for 
the defendant 's failure to appear, and t imely application is made to set it aside. 
to the neglect , mis take , or inadvertence of her counsel The fact 1 hat oc* did nor a p r e -r ^ j . ^ 
to surprise. The "ha r sh and oppress ive" default j u d g m e n t issu.\ : ^ u - Uia* • *.. i AI$ ringer 
is cont rary to the pi i rpose of R i lie 60(b) 
The plaintiff, in h is response to defendant ' s motion did not denv or controvert the facts as 
given in defendant ' s memorane . :; \ . _ ^i.;^.:- n . .,: ... . : i - m e m o r a n d u m . 
Rule 4 -501 ( l ) (B) o f the Code of judicial administrat ion provides 'that "The responding party 
shall file and serve u p o n all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in 
failed to provide any verified facts, the evidence presented bj the defendant was the • :»n ly 
evidence before the trial court. 
• It Is quite u niforml} regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to "\ acate a default 
judgment where there is reasonable justiiication or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, 
and timely application is made to set it aside. Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company. 376 P.2d 
951 952(1962) 
The negligence of attorneys are ground to remove default judgments under the rubric of 
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mistake, surprise or excusable neglect. £ee Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.. 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 
1953); Interstate Excavating. Inc. v. Agla Dev. Corp.. 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980); Helgesen v. 
Invangumia. 636 P.2d 1079 OJtah 1981). 
B. Rule 60(b> Motion was Timely and Defendant had Meritorious Defense 
In order for defendant to be relieved from a default judgment, she must not only show 
that the judgment was entered against her through any reason specified in Rule 60(b), but she 
must also show that his motion to set aside the judgment was timely, and that she has a 
meritorious defense to the action. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Musselman. 
667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983). The courts, in the interest of justice and fair play, favor, where 
possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the merits of every case. Heathman v. 
Fabian. 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 1962). In the instant matter, defendant has filed her motion within 
90 days of the judgment being entered and defendant alleges that several portions of the decree 
would have been different had the issues been litigated (R. 229-30). Further, the plaintiff did 
include relief in the decree which he did not request in his complaint (R. 229-30). This relief 
would not have been available at trial. The defendant was awarded attorneys fees, without the 
trial court having made findings regarding plaintiffs financial need, the defendant's ability to 
pay, or the reasonableness of the fees as required by Larson v. Larson. 888 P.2d 719, 726 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
The defendant in her affidavit and motion asserts that a hearing on the merits of the case 
would have resulted in a different outcome and that the decree entered by the court contains relief 
which the plaintiff did not request in his complaint (R. 229-30). Usually, it is not appropriate to 
Loporto v. Hoegemann 
Amended Brief of Appellant 
Page 8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. lie merits of such claims. Erickson v. Shenkers Tnt'l Forwarders, Inc., 8^. - -*7 
Clearly, under 'these circumstances, where 'the defendant was (1) not notified of the . •.--.-- • 
hearing date until 4:50 p m. on the Friday before trial, (2) hex attorney told her that she did not ••. 
have to appear, (3) her attorney did not tell her 'that it was the final 'trial in 'the matter but only 
another hearing, and (4) her attorney told her that she could appear telephonically for whatever 
hearing w as to take place, it w a s an abuse ol discretion lor lln li.nl eowit to ilenv ddciidanl 
Rule 60(b) motion.' - • - ' ''-"••" ' • 
H NO NOTICE GIVEN TO DEFENDANT TO APPEAR OR APPQ1> i < i * 
A. Rule 4-506 Not Complied W ith • >. -.  ->:^•-;.:-: 
As was held in Sperrv v. Smith, and 694 P 2 J '81 (Utah 1984) and Interstate Excavating. 
unrepresented party must be given notice to appear or appoini: counsel before further proceedings 
are held. Rule 4-506 of the Code of Judicial Administration requires that-
• When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws iron* ;nc ^a^ *,r -~a. _ 
to act as an attorney, opposing counsel must notify, in writing, the unrepresented client of 
••• his/her responsibility to retain another attorney or appear in person before opposing 
counsel can initiate further proceedings against 'the client, A copy of the written notice 
shall be filed with the court, and no further proceeding shall be held in the matter until 20 
days have elapsed from the date q /'* filing [emphasis added] 
This procedure was clearly not complied with in the instant matter. After the court: allowed Mr, 
sentence of 4-506(3) imposes a burden upon Mr. Christensen, which he did not fulfill The 
second sentence imposes a burden upon the court that nor further proceedings be held until Mr. 
ioporto v. Hoegemann 
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Christensen does his duty. Here, after Mr. Dent withdrew, Mr. Christensen did not file the 
appropriate notice. Further, the court took action against the defendant before the proper notice 
was filed. The rule is clear that not further proceeding may be held until 20 days after filing of 
the notice. The rule grants no discretion to the trial court to ignore or waive its provisions. 
This case is similar to Sperrv v. Smith. 694 P.2d 581 (Utah 1984). There, the defendants 
retained an attorney to represent them. He later notified them of a hearing for summary judgment 
but and withdrew as their counsel. The attorney filed and served a notice of withdrawal on 
plaintiffs counsel. At the summary judgment hearing, the defendants did not appear and 
summary judgment was granted. The defendants then re-retained the same attorney and he filed 
a Rule 60(b) motion based upon subsections 60(b)(3) ("misconduct of an adverse party") and (6) 
("any other reason justifying relief from operation of the judgment"). The defendants 
complained that plaintiffs counsel had failed follow the predecessor to Rule 4-506. Specifically, 
plaintiffs counsel had failed to provide a notice to appear or appoint counsel before further 
proceedings were had against the defendants. 
In Sperry. the plaintiff claimed that the district court had the right to waive compliance 
with the predecessor to Rule 4-506, Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice of the District Court of the 
State of Utah. The Utah Supreme Court did not necessarily fault the plaintiffs counsel for 
failing to comply with procedural requirements, as he did not receive a copy of the notice of 
withdrawal. However, the trial judge was aware of the withdrawal. The Supreme Court held 
that: 
[T]he trial judge should have required plaintiffs attorney to then give notice to [the 
defendants] in accordance with Rule 2.5 before proceeding to hear and grant the motion 
for summary judgment. Since the judgment was entered after the failure of the court to 
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o w one of its own rules, we conclude that the trial court abused it discretion in 
:sing to set aside the summary judgment when the error was brought to its attention. 
_ ;rry. 694 P.2d at 583. The situation in Sperry was the very situation which Rule 4-506 was 
designed to address. J ustice Howe, joined mi lus opinion \y\ ( hid" Justk c 1 Lill, and Jusiitc . 
Stewart, Durham and Zimmerman, held that 'the defendants "should not be deprived of 'the 
salutory protection of the rule." The summary judgment was vacated, 
ID this, CUM1 Ihc ijefcndanl al'io ri'uM ril notice ul i In1 HUIL* hut .hi1 \\i\-\ folul Jnc ilnl mil 
need to appear and was not told the nature of the hearing. The defendants in Sperry were notified 
of these facts. I he defendants in Sperry had some advanced notice of their attorneys wii:;^, . -
 a 
and the defendant here did not. Counsel for the plaintiff in Sperry had no actual notice of the 
withdrawal of opposing counsel, but Mr. Christensen was standing in the court room in this case. 
or appoint being tiled and served Soerry is a less egregious abuse of discretion than **v 5 -: uii 
matter, hi oiai cdi>c, me delcnuantb and piamtifFs counsel had greater knowledge of the situation 
than here. 
In Interstate Excavating. Inc. v. Agla Development Corp. £\* P 2d 369 (Utah 1980:, -he 
defendant's attorney .and a notice to appear or appoint filed b> plaintiffs counsel. The defendant 
denied receiving either nou^ ^ ..u: . ^ a ^ u i u did not appear at trial, a default was entered 
than the denial *•'• the motion. After reciting that courts are generally indulgent toward the setting 
aside of default judgments and whs^ mciv ^ u<^ - «. ..ang it aside, the doubt should be 
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resolved in favor of doing so," the court concluded that the interests of justice would be served 
by setting aside the default and allowing the parties to present their side of the controversy. The 
default judgment was vacated. In this matter, the defendant maintains that she had no knowledge 
that the trial was to be held on June 23,1997 and had been told by her counsel that she did not 
need to appear (R. 229). No contrary evidence was presented prior to the matter being submitted 
for decision. There was evidence before the court in Interstate Excavating that the defendants had 
been sent the notice of withdrawal and notice to appear or appoint prior to the default having 
been entered. Here, it is clear that the defendant was not mailed the notice of withdrawal until 
after the default was entered and that Mr. Christensen, plaintiffs counsel, never served a notice 
i 
to appear or appoint. As was the case in Sperry. the Interstate Excavating case is a much less 
agregious abuse of discretion than the instant matter. 
Trial courts are given no discretion to ignore the provisions of Rule 4-506. In Hartford ( 
Leasing Corp. v. State. 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1994), the trial court excused the State for 
failing to provide a notice to appear or appoint The court held that 'the rule's provisions, 
i 
however, offer no room for such discretion to excuse noncompliance: 'opposing counsel must... 
before opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings."' [citation omitted]. Hartford Leasing 
Corp. 888 P.2d at 700. The prohibition against any further proceedings being held is likewise < 
mandatory: "no further proceedings shall be held . . . " [emphasis added] Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Rule 4-506(3). 
B. Section 78-51-36 Not Complied With 
Further, a notice to appear or appoint is required by statute. Section 78-51-36 of the Utah 
Code provides that: 1 
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When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or ceases to act as such, a party to an 
action or proceeding for whom, he was acting as attorney must, before any further 
proceedings are had against him be required by the adverse party, by written notice, to 
appoint another attorney or to appear in person. 
Mr. Dent's withdrawal of counsel on the morning of trial is the same as if the he died or been 
suspended. He ceased to act and Ms, Hoegemann's attorney without providing the reasonable 
required by statute was not followed, and the defendant was not given proper notice to appear or 
appoint counsel before further proceedings were initiated against her. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence before the court was that the defendant was contacted by her attorney on the 
the attorney did not notify her that it was the final trial He told her that she did not have to 
appear. At trial, he withdrew as counsel with the leave of the court and without providing any 
additional relief to the plaintiff. The defendant's failure to appear is clearly due to surprise, 
mistake and the neglect of her counsel under Rule 60(b)(, ... luUu^ ui \ii. i. uiistensen fo 
file a notice of appearance of counsel is a violation of Rule u *v », ds ins iaku;^ *\-r*-
against the plaintiff was a violation, of his responsibilities uhder .<ule 4-506 Final • \ :ne , • -w;; * 
entering of the ileiatili alia tin: w itlidmwal nf detendjnl s UHIIIM.'I .ind llie yianLiiy ui iurLhtT 
relief was a violation of Rule 4-506(3), which provides "that "no 'further proceedings shall be held 
in the case until 20 days have elapsed from filing of the date -f filing " This entitles the 
defendant to relief under R i lie 60(b)(6) As discussed .- M,C;.; and Intersmic nxcavating 
i'.-1-..'sdBrief of Appellant 
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the rules were followed to a much greater degree and the defendants were in a much better 
position than here. As stated in Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company. 376 P.2d 951 (Utah 
1962): 
To clamp a judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a party without a hearing is obviously a 
harsh and oppressive thing. It is fundamental in our system of justice that each party to a 
controversy should be afforded an opportunity to present his side of the case. For that 
reason it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a default 
judgment where there is reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to 
appear, and timely application is made to set it aside. 
In both Sperry and Interstate Excavating, where less egregious abuses of discretion occurred than 
the instant matter, the appellate court vacated the judgments which resulted from the defendants' 
failure to appear. That relief should be granted to defendant here and the she should be afforded 
an opportunity to present her side of the case. 
Dated this 17th day of August, 1998. 
Samuel G. Draper, for 
Hughes & Read 
< 
Loporto v. Hoegemann 
Amended Brief of Appellant 
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Brief of Appellant upon R. Clay Huntsman, the counsel for the AppUee in this matter, by mailing 
it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
R. Clay Huntsman 
Paul R. Christensen 
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN 
283 West Hilton Drive, Ste. 3 
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ADDENDUM 
MINUTES OF BENCH IAL 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT-ST GEORGE COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN A LOPORTO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
LUCY Z LOPORTO, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
MINUTES 
BENCH TRIAL 
C a s e No: 9 5 4 5 0 0 4 2 4 DA 
J u d g e : JAMES L . SHUMJ 
D a t e : J u n e 2 3 , 1 3 9 7 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): JOHN A LOPORTO 
Plaintiff's Attorney (s) : PAUL R CHRISTENSEN 
Defendant's Attorney (s) : HAROLD J DENT 
Video 
Tape Number: 970234 Tape Count: 9:05 
Clerk: gwynm 
TRIAL 
TAPE 970234 
TIME 9 :GS 
On reoord 
At the time of the trial a record is made in reference to 
Mr. Dent withdrawing from the case. Pleadings are moot. 
Mr. Christensen's motion for default, attorney fees and 
waiver of defendant's entitlement to the retirment fund. 
Motion is granted and counsel is to oreoare the order. 
TIMS 9:08 
Off record 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
HON. JAMES L. SHUMATE, judge 
JOHN 
LUCY 
A. 
Z. 
LOPORTO, ) 
P l a i n t i f f , ) 
v s . ) 
(LOPORTO) HOEGEMANN, ) 
D e f e n d a n t . ) 
Civil No. 954500424 
(Videotaped Proceedings) 
REPORTER'S HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
Monday, June 23, 1997 
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENS EN 
BY: PAUL R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ. 
283 West Hilton Drive, Suite 3 
St. George, Utah 84770 
SCARTH & DENT 
BY: HAROLD J. DENT, ESQ. 
150 North 200 East, Suite 203 
St. George, Utah 8 477 0 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
CERTIFiED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
P.O. BOX 153-1 
ST. GEORGE. UTAH S - " i 
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-cCc-
THE COURT: Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. 
The record will reflect that today is the 2 3rd day of June, 
19S7, and the hour is 9:03 A.M. 
Two matters are on the calendar for a hearing on 
this morning's date. The first one is Loporto versus 
Loporto. The file number there is 954500424. 
Mr. Lcpcrto is present. His counsel, 
Mr. Christensen, is also present. 
Counsel, I am informed by Mr. Dent, through the 
clerk's office, that he does not have his client here, 
intends to ask leave of the Court to withdraw, and based 
upon that, would basically leave this matter in a position 
of entering a default. 
Is that your understanding as well? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's my understanding, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Here comes Mr. Dent right now, so 
I'll stop talking for him and let him say it himself. 
Mr. Dent, I just put on the record the 
information that was conveyed to me in Loporto that 
indicated that your client was not here. That you had 
difficulty, apparently, in your relationship with the 
DATTT. n vr/~iUTTT T TXT 
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client and had asked leave to withdraw in Lcpcrto. 
Is that correct, Counsel? 
MR. DENT: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Your motion to withdraw 
is granted. The pleadings of the defendant are ordered 
stricken. 
Mr. Christensen, you may take your relief 
sought, and you may take attorney's fees as well. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. My one 
concern is — is that there's a retirement fund in this 
particular matter. And under the Woodward v. Woodward, the 
defendant would be entitled to one half of that. However, 
based upon the facts that we haven't received child support 
or any of the other costs such as medical care or child 
care, we would be seeking for having her waive any 
entitlement to that retirement. 
THE COURT: Counsel, the Court, in view of this 
defendant's recalcitrance in prosecuting this litigation, 
the difficult times that this file shows that have gone on 
through this manner, I think the equities in the case 
firmly support the award of the entire retirement fund. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So you may draft your pleadings 
accordingly, and I'll sign them. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
PATTT. n MPMTTTT.TM 
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THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
MR. DENT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Whereupon, the matter was concluded.) 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, a Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public duly qualified in and 
for the State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing matter, to wit, JOHN A. 
LOPORTO VS- LUCY 2. (LOPORTO) HOEGEHANN, CIVIL NO. 
954500424, was videotaped at the time and place therein 
named and thereafter, to the best of my listening and 
understanding, reduced to computerized transcription. 
I further testify that I am not interested in 
the event of the action. 
WITNESS my hand and seal this 2nd day of 
December, 1997. 
PiftJL G. 'i&ZMULLIN, CSR, RPR 
RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 3-17-99 ,• 
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AFFIDAVIT OF LUCY "OEGEMANN . . . . ' _ ; " _ 
CONFORMED ' " "' CC R 
COPY J? SE? 18 PFJ 4 18 
W;.:H.N „.••:•, C O U N T Y • 
M V 
SAMUEL G. DRAPER (Bar Nc. 7050) 
HUGHES & READ 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Defendan t 
187 Ncrzh 100 West 
S t . Geo rge , Utah 84770 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 673-4392 
Fax:" (801) 673-2774 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATS OF UTAH 
JOHN A. 
v. 
LUCY Z. 
LOPCRTC, 
Plaintiff, 
(LOFORTO) KOEGEMANN, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT LUCY ECEGSMANN 
Case No. 9545QC424 
Judge James L. Shumate 
. ^ — — — — — — — — - ^ ^ _ ^ ^ _ _ _ — — ^ _ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OE WASHINGTON ) 
Defendant LUCY HCEGEMAMN, being first duly sworn, stages and 
alleges as follows, to-wit: 
1. I am an adult resident of Clark County, State of Nevada, and a.?. 
fully competent as to the matters set forth herein, and do so 
based upon my own personal knowledge. 
2. The trial in this case was scheduled for Monday, June 23, 1997. 
3. I was represented by Jay Dent. 
4. He did not notify me of the hearing date until the Friday prior 
to trial at 4 :50 p.m. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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my paperwork was lost. This was the reason that I was net: 
notified sooner. 
I reside in Las Vegas and had committed to work on the following 
Monday. 
At the time I was notified of the hearing date, there was no one 
I could have requested the day off from around. 
Mr. Dent called me on Sunday night at my home, and told me that 
he would contact me on Monday from the courtroom, and that at 
that I could appear by telephone. 
At no time did he tell me it was for the final trial in this 
matter; he told me it was just a hearing. 
He said that he was going to tell the judge that the parties were 
close to settlement and there were just a few issues to work out. 
Consequently, I did not appear at the hearing. Indeed, I was the 
only person working at my office on Monday and could not have 
taken the day off on such short notice. 
After the date of the hearing, I received a notice of withdrawal 
of counsel from Mr. Dent and a Notice of Entry of the decree. 
I relied on my attorneys assertion that I did not have to appear 
for the hearing scheduled for hearing. 
In the event my case had proceeded to trial and I had been 
present, I believe that the decree would have been different in 
relation to child support, property division, and visitation. 
Snmp nf t "hp n m n p r f v PWP r r l p d t n f h p n l ^ i n t i f f i n rh<a H^^r-^o w;= q 
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my premarital property, and should have been awarded to me. 
Some of my personal items which had been awarded to me in prior 
court orders were also awarded to the plaintiff. 
The income numbers in the child support calculation in the decree 
are incorrect, as is my place of employment and occupation. 
The restrictions placed on my visitation are unreasonable and 
would not have been ordered by the court should the case have 
been tried. 
I believe that it is in the best interests of the children that 
these issues be tried by the court. 
The allocation of attorneys fees is also unfounded in law or 
equity and this issue should be tried by the court. 
The allocation of Jerry Thamert's costs to me is also 
unreasonable and unfounded. 
FURTHER TKY AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED THIS Q day of September, 1997. 
On the 6 day of September, 1997, personally appeared 
before me LUCY KOEGEMANN, the signer of the foregoing af f ic^ rv^ t, 
duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same 
771 
Notary Pu!..-
•TATE OF U" 
••••shingtcn COL;" 
• • ' S L L E M . G C C A 
JOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
My commission expires: 
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CSRTIFICAT5 OF MAILING -
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF LUCY H0EG2MANN was placed in the United 
States mail at St. Gecrcre, Utah, with first-class pcstaae thereon 
fully prepaid, en the I* day of September, 1997, addressed as 
fellows: 
John A. Locorto 
223 South 2100 East 
Su. George, UT 84770 
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Paul R. Christensen USB No. 5677 
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
.283 West Hilton Drive, Ste. 3 
St- George, Utah 8 4 770 
Telephone: (435) 623-2846 
Facsimile: (435) 623-3049 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAi 
JOHN A. LOPORTO, 
Flaintiff, 
vs. 
LUCY Z. (LOPORTO) KCEGEMANN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
lase No. 9 54 5004 2 4 
Judcre James L. Shumate 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the above-
entitled Court en Thursday, December 4, 1997 en Defendant's Metier. 
to Strike Hearing scheduled for December 5, 1997. Plaintiff 
appeared personally, and was represented bv Paul P.. Christensen of 
the law firm of HUNTSMAN £ CHRISTENSEN. Defendant did not appear, 
but was represented by Samuel G. Draper of the law firm cf HUGHES 
& READ. The Court made a record that the Motions and Memoranda cf 
the parties had been read. The Court heard argument from counsel 
of both parties. No witnesses were called. 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1 
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The hearing heretofore set for December 3 1007
 a- t-
of 2:00 p.m. en Defendant's Motion for Relief from Dec: 
stricken. •-. - -
hour 
JS is 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
Defendant's Motion for Relief from Decree is 
V2 . ceniec Dated this cay cf / -XJT 
\ v TLTT 
-:E COURT, 
DISTR ICT c-Su *- vJ UL'^C 
Approved as to Form 
.^ . ,v , ,,j(s / H i 
Sar.uei G. Draoer 
^GEZS & READ* 
.Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE EY MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the ~ ~ dav of i 
1997, I mailed a true and correct unsigned copy of the above and 
foregoing ORDER by placing same in the United States Mail, first-
class postage prepaid, to the following to wit: 
Samuel G. Draper 
HUGHES St READ 
Attorney at Law 
13 7 North 10 0 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 .- -. 
Secretarv 
CERTIFICATE CF SERVICE 5Y MAILING 
I dc herebv certifv that on the -J,*. r\ b. dav cf X St <' ->- h. 
1997, I mailed a true and correct sicned copy of the above' and 
foregoing ORDER by placing same in the United States Mail, first-
class postage prepaid, to the following to wit: 
Samuel G. Draper 
HUGHES & READ 
Attorney for Defendant 
137 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 3 477 0 ,,--'" "N 
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SAMUEL G, DRAPER (Bar No. 7050) 
HUGHES & READ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
187 North 100 West 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: (435) 673-4892 
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ORIGINAL 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN A. 
v. 
LUCY Z. 
LOPORTO, 
Plaintiff, 
(LOPORTO) HOEGEMANN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No.: 954500424 
Judge : Jarr.esL. Shumate 
Defendant, by and through her attorney, Samuel G. Draper, 
having motioned the court to reconsider it's Order entered December 
19, 1997, and Plaintiff, by and through his attorney, Paul Christensen 
having filed an Objection and Memorandum in opposition thereto, and 
the matter having been submitted for decision. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
• Defendant's Motion to Reconsider is hereby granted, 
and defendant is relieved from the July 7,1997 decree. 
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I 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider i s denied. 
DATED this day of January, 1998 
BY THE COURT 
-ESPIES L. SHUMATE ^~ 
District Court Judce 
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I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing ORDES., was placed in the United States mail at St 
George, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid, on the 
1^3^ day of January, 1998, addressed as follows: 
Paul R. Christensen 
HUNTSMAN & CHRISTENSEN 
283 West Hilton Drive, Suite 3 
St. George, UT 84770 
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